Mossadegh Ousted no Irã - História

Mossadegh Ousted no Irã - História


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Em 1951, sob a direção do primeiro-ministro iraniano Mohammed Mossadegh, o governo iraniano nacionalizou a indústria petrolífera iraniana (anteriormente propriedade da Anglo-Iranian Oil Company). Os britânicos apelaram para a Corte Internacional de Justiça, que decidiu a favor da Grã-Bretanha. Ao longo de 1952, a disputa entre a Grã-Bretanha e o Irã grassou. Em 1953, Mossadegh começou a visar iranianos ricos por não pagarem impostos. Mossadegh também teve como alvo a Família Real. Em 16 de agosto, após tentar expulsar Mossadegh, o Xá foi forçado a fugir. Ele voltou ao poder seis dias depois, após o exército se rebelar contra Mossadegh, com a ajuda dos serviços de inteligência dos EUA e britânicos.

Flashback: Por dentro da história complicada entre os EUA e o Irã

As tensões entre os EUA e o Irã aumentaram esta semana quando o Corpo da Guarda Revolucionária Iraniana (IRGC) abateu um drone dos EUA, quase levando a ataques aéreos de retaliação. O Irã disse que a nave entrou no espaço aéreo do país & # 8217s. Os EUA alegaram que o drone abatido sobrevoou águas internacionais, caracterizando o incidente como um & # 8220 ataque não provocado. & # 8221

É apenas o capítulo mais recente na complexa história entre o Irã e os EUA, que FRONTLINE explorou como parte do documentário de 2018 Rivais amargos: Irã e Arábia Saudita.

Conforme mostrado no capítulo de abertura do filme de duas partes, pelo menos parte da tensão entre os Estados Unidos e o Irã pode ser rastreada até 1953, quando um golpe arquitetado pela CIA e espiões britânicos depuseram Mohammed Mossadegh, o homem do Parlamento do Irã e # 8217 escolhido para liderar seu primeiro governo eleito democraticamente.

Mossadegh, que nacionalizou a indústria petrolífera britânica do Irã e expulsou o xá apoiado pelo Ocidente de Teerã, foi preso e viveu em cativeiro até sua morte 14 anos depois.

Conforme relata o filme, após a expulsão de Mossadegh, os EUA desempenharam um papel fundamental no apoio ao regime repressivo do xá reinstalado. Isso veio por meio de palavras e força militar: o presidente Jimmy Carter elogiou a "grande liderança" do xá & # 8217, os EUA lhe venderam armas e a CIA treinou sua polícia secreta, que reprimiu brutalmente a oposição. O descontentamento do povo iraniano com o xá, e o que eles viram como décadas de exploração ocidental, culminaria na revolução de 1979 e na ascensão do aiatolá Khomeini.

& # 8220Havia um enorme entusiasmo e apoio porque a linha inicial de Khomeini não era sectária, contra os sunitas e tal, era anti-americana, & # 8221 Ahmed Rashid, autor de Descent Into Chaos, disse FRONTLINE no filme.


História da BP British Petroleum e seu papel no Golpe do Irã de 1953

A BP é acusada de destruir a vida selvagem e o litoral da América, mas se você olhar para trás na história, verá que a BP fez algo ainda pior para a América.

Eles deram ao mundo o aiatolá Khomeini.

Claro que há muitos fatores que levaram à revolução iraniana, mas em 1951 a Anglo-Iranian Oil Company & # 8211, que mais tarde se tornaria a BP & # 8211 e seu principal proprietário, o governo britânico, conspirou para destruir a democracia e instalar um ocidental -regime controlado no Irã. A raiva resultante e a repressão que se seguiu foram uma das principais causas da revolução iraniana em 1978/79 & # 8211, da qual surgiu o regime islâmico do aiatolá Khomeini.

E mais, a BP e o governo britânico foram tão arrogantes e desajeitadamente ineptos em lidar com a crise que tiveram de persuadir os americanos a ajudá-los. Eles fizeram isso fingindo que havia uma ameaça comunista ao Irã. O governo americano, liderado pelo presidente Eisenhower, acreditou neles e a CIA foi instruída a engendrar um golpe que destituiu o primeiro-ministro iraniano Mohamed Mossadegh.

E a raiva resultante do golpe entre os iranianos foi muito profunda. É a raiz do motivo pelo qual a América agora é conhecida como & # 8220O Grande Satã & # 8221 no Irã, e por que a embaixada americana em 1979 foi odiada como & # 8220 o ninho de espiões & # 8221 pelos revolucionários.

A história da empresa que hoje chamamos de BP nos últimos cem anos traçou realmente o arco do capitalismo transnacional global. Essa empresa começou como uma espécie de operação invasora no Irã na primeira década do século XX. Foi muito empreendedor e cheio de riscos, e eles tiveram um bando de geólogos correndo por essas estepes e desertos terríveis e, finalmente, encontraram o que foi a maior descoberta até então na história da indústria do petróleo. Foram eles que descobriram que o Irã estava sentado em um oceano de petróleo. E então eles decidiram que iriam aceitar. Sob um acordo corrupto que haviam fechado com alguns representantes da antiga monarquia iraniana em declínio, todos pagos pela empresa, esta concessão, que mais tarde ficou conhecida como Anglo-Persian Oil Company, garantiu-se ou ganhou o direito de possuir todo o petróleo iraniano. Portanto, ninguém no Irã tinha o direito de perfurar ou extrair petróleo ou vender petróleo.

Então, logo após a descoberta, o governo britânico decidiu comprar a empresa. Portanto, o Parlamento aprovou uma lei e comprou 51% dessa empresa. E durante as décadas de 1920, 1930 e 1940, todo o padrão de vida que as pessoas na Inglaterra desfrutavam era sustentado pelo petróleo iraniano. Todos os caminhões e jipes da Grã-Bretanha operavam com petróleo iraniano. As fábricas em toda a Grã-Bretanha estavam sendo financiadas pelo petróleo iraniano. A Royal Navy, que projetava o poder britânico em todo o mundo, era 100% operada com petróleo do Irã. Portanto, essa se tornou a base fundamental da vida britânica.

E então, após a Segunda Guerra Mundial, quando os ventos do nacionalismo e anticolonialismo sopravam por todo o mundo em desenvolvimento, os iranianos desenvolveram esta ideia: temos que pegar nosso petróleo de volta. E esse foi o general - o tipo de paixão nacional que trouxe ao poder Mohammad Mosaddegh, que foi a figura mais proeminente no período democrático do Irã durante o final dos anos 40 e início dos anos 50. Era o desejo de Mosaddegh, apoiado por um voto unânime do parlamento democraticamente eleito do Irã, nacionalizar o que então era a Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. Eles realizaram a nacionalização.

Os britânicos e seus parceiros nos Estados Unidos resistiram ferozmente a isso. E quando não puderam evitar que isso acontecesse, eles organizaram a derrubada de Mosaddegh em 1953. Assim, essa derrubada não apenas produziu o fim do governo de Mosaddegh, mas o fim da democracia no Irã, e isso desencadeou todas as outras consequências seguintes . O Xá governou por 25 anos com repressão crescente. Seu governo produziu a explosão do final dos anos 70 que produziu o regime islâmico. Portanto, foi para proteger os interesses da empresa de petróleo que agora conhecemos como BP que a CIA e o Serviço Secreto Britânico se uniram para derrubar o governo democrático do Irã e produzir todas as consequências que vimos no Irã no último semestre- século.

AMY GOODMAN: E isso envolveu os dois irmãos Dulles - as pessoas costumam voar para o Aeroporto de Dulles - John Foster Dulles, Allen Dulles e também o neto de Teddy Roosevelt.

STEPHEN KINZER: Sim, a história está piscando para nós a partir desse episódio. É uma peculiaridade bastante interessante que Theodore Roosevelt, que essencialmente trouxe os Estados Unidos para a era da mudança de regime por volta do início do século XX, acabou tendo um neto que iniciou a era moderna de intervenção. Lembre-se de que o Irã foi o primeiro país onde a CIA entrou para derrubar um governo. Quando Teddy Roosevelt estava derrubando governos, não havia CIA. Assim, cada um deles abriu um capítulo na história do intervencionismo americano.

AMY GOODMAN: E por que - antes de avançarmos agora, por que os EUA intervieram em nome de uma empresa britânica, que mais tarde se tornou a British Petroleum, ou BP?

STEPHEN KINZER: Houve várias razões para isso. Parte disso tinha a ver com o desejo de solidariedade transatlântica. Mas eu realmente acho que houve dois motivos principais. Uma foi que os americanos se convenceram de que tinham que lutar contra o comunismo em algum lugar do mundo. Essa foi a ideia com a qual Dulles e Eisenhower chegaram ao poder em 1953, que eles não iriam mais ficar com a estratégia de contenção do comunismo, mas iriam para uma nova estratégia de retrocesso. Mas assim que chegaram ao poder, pensaram: “Como vamos reverter o comunismo? Não podemos invadir a União Soviética. Não vamos bombardear a China. ”

E aqui é onde a outra peça entrou. Os britânicos estavam muito ansiosos para derrubar Mosaddegh a fim de recuperar sua companhia de petróleo. Mas quando eles apresentaram o plano a Dulles e Eisenhower, o agente que eles enviaram a Washington, que mais tarde escreveu suas memórias, fez algo muito inteligente. Ele decidiu que não vai funcionar se eu disser aos americanos: “Por favor, derrube Mosaddegh para que possamos ter nossa companhia de petróleo de volta”. Os americanos não responderão a isso. Eles não vão se importar o suficiente. Eles terão medo do precedente de um governo assumir o controle de uma empresa que produz um recurso em um país pobre. Esse é um péssimo precedente para John Foster Dulles e americanos, tanto quanto é para os britânicos. Mas o que os americanos estão realmente preocupados neste momento no início dos anos 50 é o comunismo, então vamos dizer a eles que Mosaddegh está levando o Irã ao comunismo. Bem, Mosaddegh era um aristocrata idoso que desprezava todas as idéias socialistas e marxistas, mas isso era apenas um detalhe. Ele pôde ser retratado como uma pessoa fraca o suficiente para que mais tarde sua queda pudesse produzir uma tentativa dos comunistas de assumir o controle do Irã.

Portanto, foi essa combinação de querer ter certeza de que o exemplo não foi dado no mundo de que os governos nacionalistas poderiam apenas nacionalizar empresas de propriedade de países ricos e, em segundo lugar, qualquer pessoa que pudesse entrar no âmbito americano como sendo possivelmente nem mesmo simpatizante do comunismo , mas criar uma situação em que, depois que ele partisse, pudesse haver instabilidade que poderia levar a um governo comunista, acabaria sendo um alvo dos EUA.

O presidente Harry Truman resistiu aos esforços dos britânicos para persuadir os EUA a derrubar Mossadegh, respeitando a vontade do povo iraniano. Os britânicos tiveram mais sorte com Dwight Eisenhower. Pouco depois de sua posse, os ingleses fizeram sua apresentação. “Não desejando ser acusado de tentar usar os americanos para tirar castanhas britânicas do fogo”, escreveu Christopher Montague Woodhouse, um importante agente da inteligência britânica envolvido na campanha, “Decidi enfatizar a ameaça comunista ao Irã, em vez da necessidade de recuperar o controle da indústria do petróleo.”

O golpe “abre caminho para a incubação do extremismo, tanto da esquerda quanto da direita. Este extremismo tornou-se inalteravelmente anti-americano, ” oferece James A. Bill, autor de "The Shah, the Ayatollah, and the U.S."

Em 2000, os EUA finalmente reconheceram seu papel no golpe. “Em 1953, os Estados Unidos desempenharam um papel significativo na orquestração da derrubada do popular primeiro-ministro do Irã, Mohammed Mossadegh,” disse a Secretária de Estado Madeleine Albright. “O governo Eisenhower acreditava que suas ações eram justificadas por razões estratégicas. Mas o golpe foi claramente um revés para o desenvolvimento político do Irã. E é fácil ver agora porque muitos iranianos continuam a se ressentir dessa intervenção da América em seus assuntos internos. ”

Woodhouse, o agente britânico que persuadiu os EUA a se envolver, admitiu anos depois que as coisas ficaram fora de controle no simples esforço de recuperar o petróleo da BP.
& # 8211 De todos os homens do Shaw

os fatos relacionados ao papel da BP & # 8217 no Golpe do Irã de 1953 são detalhados no Huffington Post e no Democracy Now & # 8211, mas de acordo com nossa pesquisa, você não os encontrará na Wikipedia ou em qualquer meio de comunicação convencional, exceto neste Blog da BBC.


A CIA finalmente admite que planejou o golpe do Irã em 1953

“O envolvimento americano e britânico na deposição de Mossadegh é de conhecimento público há muito tempo, mas a postagem de hoje inclui o que se acredita ser o primeiro reconhecimento formal da CIA de que a agência ajudou a planejar e executar o golpe,” disse o Arquivo de Segurança Nacional dos EUA.

A publicação de segunda-feira sob a Lei de Liberdade de Informação dos Estados Unidos foi uma surpresa, já que a maioria dos materiais e registros do golpe de 1953 foram destruídos pela CIA, disse o Arquivo. A CIA disse na época que é “Os cofres estavam muito cheios”.

Os documentos recém-revelados desclassificam documentos sobre a operação TPAJAX da CIA que buscou uma mudança de regime no Irã por meio do suborno de políticos iranianos, oficiais de segurança e de alto escalão do exército e propaganda anti-Mossadegh em massa que ajudou a instigar a revolta pública em 1953.

Entre os documentos desclassificados, há vários exemplos de propaganda da CIA apresentando o PM iraniano Mossadegh de forma depreciativa.

“Esta peça de propaganda acusa o primeiro-ministro de fingir ser 'o salvador do Irã' e alega que ele, em vez disso, construiu um vasto aparelho de espionagem que treinou em praticamente todos os setores da sociedade, do exército a jornais, políticos e religiosos líderes, ” o Arquivo disse. “Agitando imagens de sua suposta aliança com o‘ assassino Qashqai Khan ’e os bolcheviques, os autores acusam:‘ É assim que você salva o Irã, Mossadegh? Nós sabemos o que você deseja salvar. Você quer salvar a ditadura de Mossadegh no Irã! '”

Em abril de 1951, os iranianos elegeram democraticamente o chefe do partido Frente Nacional, Dr. Mohammad Mossadegh, como primeiro-ministro. Mossadegh agiu rapidamente para nacionalizar os ativos no Irã da Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (a precursora da atual BP), uma medida que colocou seu governo em confronto com a Grã-Bretanha e os EUA.

A inteligência militar britânica do MI6 então se uniu à CIA e planejou, elaborou e executou um golpe que depôs Mossadegh em agosto de 1953 e devolveu o xá Mohammad Reza Pahlavi ao poder.

A primeira tentativa de golpe falhou depois que Mossadegh ficou sabendo da conspiração, mas os serviços de inteligência americanos e britânicos no Irã improvisaram uma segunda fase do golpe, reunindo forças pró-Shah e organizando protestos em massa em 19 de agosto de 1953. Esses protestos foram imediatos apoiado pelo exército e pela polícia. A casa de Mossadegh foi destruída após um ataque prolongado por forças golpistas, incluindo vários tanques.

Mossadegh foi substituído pelo general iraniano Fazlollah Zahedi, escolhido a dedo pelo MI6 e pela CIA. Mossaddegh foi posteriormente condenado à morte, mas o Xá nunca se atreveu a cumprir a sentença. Mossadegh morreu em sua residência perto de Teerã em 1967.

A ditadura pró-Ocidente do Xá continuou por 27 anos e terminou com a Revolução Islâmica de 1979, que abriu o caminho para o Irã de hoje, onde os sentimentos antiamericanos permanecem fortes. O golpe de 1953 ainda lança uma longa sombra sobre as relações Irã-EUA.

Os documentos desclassificados se originaram de um relatório provisório, denominado “A Batalha pelo Irã”, preparado por um historiador interno da CIA em meados da década de 1970. O historiador escreveu: “[O] golpe militar que derrubou Mossadegh e seu gabinete da Frente Nacional foi realizado sob a direção da CIA como um ato de política externa dos EUA.” O relatório também menciona que o establishment dos EUA temia que o Irã pudesse ser “Aberto à agressão soviética”, e, portanto, iniciou a Operação TPAJAX, que acabou se tornando a parte americana da ‘Operação Ajax’ conjunta EUA-Britânica que levou o Xá ao poder.

O "agressão”Mencionado pelo historiador da CIA é provavelmente uma referência à intervenção da União Soviética no Irã durante a Segunda Guerra Mundial, quando um tratado URSS-Irã assinado em 1940 permitiu a Moscou estabelecer prescrições militares no Irã em caso de qualquer ameaça às fronteiras da União Soviética. Moscou colocou esse tratado em prática durante a Segunda Guerra Mundial e ocupou parcialmente o Irã em 1941-1945.

O Arquivo de Segurança Nacional disse que, embora “Aplaude a decisão da CIA de disponibilizar esses materiais; a postagem de hoje mostra claramente que esses materiais poderiam ter sido desclassificados com segurança há muitos anos, sem risco de danos à segurança nacional.”

Embora pelo menos dois presidentes dos EUA, Bill Clinton e Barack Obama, tenham reconhecido publicamente o papel dos EUA no golpe iraniano, os serviços de inteligência em Washington sempre relutaram em admitir envolvimento direto no golpe de 1953.

Após o colapso da URSS, a CIA proclamou uma “política de abertura” e se comprometeu a divulgar alguns documentos relativos às operações secretas da Guerra Fria, incluindo o golpe no Irã, pela inteligência dos EUA.

Três diretores sucessivos da CIA - Robert M. Gates, R. James Woolsey e John M. Deutch - prometeram publicar documentos, mas nenhum cumpriu.

O vice-diretor do arquivo, Malcolm Byrne, apelou à comunidade de inteligência dos EUA “Para disponibilizar totalmente os registros restantes sobre o período do golpe.”

“Não há mais um bom motivo para manter segredos sobre um episódio tão crítico em nosso passado recente. Os fatos básicos são amplamente conhecidos por todos os alunos do Irã. Suprimir os detalhes apenas distorce a história e alimenta a criação de mitos por todos os lados, ” Byrne disse.


E se Mossadegh permanecesse no poder no Irã

Futurista

Um ponto lateral interessante, mas é muito possível que o Irã tivesse muito mais judeus em tal cenário. Quando magos religiosos chegaram ao poder em 1979, a maioria dos 80.000 judeus remanescentes do Irã emigrou, mas se a Revolução Iraniana de 1979 fosse completamente evitada, então muito mais judeus poderiam ter permanecido no Irã.

Também concordo com o que @betgo e @Larrey escreveram aqui.

Stevev

Não há respostas certas ou erradas nestes & quotQue se? & Quot. A geografia por si só sugere um certo grau de influência soviética. Eu também disse que o Irã permaneceria independente. Stalin queria manter as províncias do norte e do noroeste e as manteve por um tempo depois que os outros aliados partiram. Havia um partido comunista ativo no Irã. Não sei por que Stalin cedeu, exceto possivelmente para evitar problemas com seus ex-aliados. Mossadegh era socialista, mas foi acusado de buscar o poder ditatorial. Ele queria permanecer neutro na nascente Guerra Fria, mas sem aliados, o Irã era vulnerável a uma invasão soviética. Considerando que a URSS invadiu o Afeganistão e saiu impune, não é absurdo.


SEGREDOS DA HISTÓRIA: O C.I.A. no Irã - Um relatório especial. Como uma trama convulsionou o Irã em & # x2753 (e em & # x2779)

Por quase cinco décadas, o papel dos Estados Unidos no golpe militar que depôs o Irã e os 27s eleitos como primeiro-ministro e devolveu o xá ao poder se perdeu na história, objeto de intenso debate no Irã e do silêncio pedregoso nos Estados Unidos. Um por um, os participantes se aposentaram ou morreram sem revelar detalhes importantes, e a Agência Central de Inteligência disse que vários registros da operação - sua primeira derrubada bem-sucedida de um governo estrangeiro - foram destruídos.

Mas uma cópia da história secreta da agência & # x27s do golpe de 1953 veio à tona, revelando o funcionamento interno de uma trama que preparou o cenário para a revolução islâmica em 1979 e para uma geração de ódio antiamericano em um dos países do Oriente Médio e # x27s países mais poderosos.

O documento, que permanece sigiloso, revela o papel central que os funcionários da inteligência britânica desempenharam no início e no planejamento do golpe, e mostra que Washington e Londres compartilhavam o interesse em manter o controle do Ocidente sobre o petróleo iraniano.

A história secreta, escrita pelo planejador chefe do golpe C.I.A. & # X27s e obtida pelo The New York Times, diz que o sucesso da operação & # x27s foi principalmente uma questão de acaso. O documento mostra que a agência tinha um desprezo quase total pelo homem que estava dando poder, o xá Mohammed Reza Pahlevi, a quem ridicularizou como um covarde vacilante. E narra, pela primeira vez, os esforços torturados da agência para seduzir e persuadir o xá a tomar parte em seu próprio golpe.

A operação, de codinome TP-Ajax, foi o projeto para uma sucessão de C.I.A. planos para fomentar golpes e desestabilizar governos durante a guerra fria - incluindo o golpe bem-sucedido da agência & # x27s na Guatemala em 1954 e a desastrosa intervenção cubana conhecida como Baía dos Porcos em 1961. Em mais de um caso, tais operações levaram ao mesmo tipo de animosidade de longo prazo contra os Estados Unidos que ocorreu no Irã.

A história diz que oficiais da agência que orquestraram o golpe no Irã trabalharam diretamente com oficiais militares iranianos monarquistas, escolheram a dedo o substituto do primeiro-ministro, enviaram uma torrente de enviados para reforçar a coragem do xá, dirigiram uma campanha de bombardeios por iranianos se passando por membros do Partido Comunista, e plantou artigos e cartuns editoriais nos jornais.

Mas na noite marcada para a derrubada do primeiro-ministro Mohammed Mossadegh & # x27s, quase nada saiu de acordo com os planos meticulosamente traçados, diz a história secreta. Na verdade, C.I.A. as autoridades estavam prestes a fugir do país quando vários oficiais iranianos recrutados pela agência, agindo por conta própria, assumiram o comando de uma manifestação pró-xá em Teerã e tomaram o governo.

Dois dias depois do golpe, revela a história, funcionários da agência canalizaram US $ 5 milhões para o Irã para ajudar o governo que haviam instalado a consolidar o poder.

Os contornos do papel americano no golpe foram revelados no Irã no início e mais tarde nas memórias de C.I.A. oficiais e outras contas publicadas. Mas muitos detalhes permaneceram confidenciais, e a história secreta obtida pelo The New York Times é o primeiro relato governamental detalhado do golpe a ser tornado público.

O C.I.A. demorou a disponibilizar os arquivos iranianos. Dois diretores da central de inteligência, Robert Gates e R. James Woolsey, prometeram desclassificar os registros das primeiras ações secretas da agência, incluindo o golpe. Mas a agência disse há três anos que vários documentos relevantes foram destruídos no início dos anos 1960 & # x27.

A C.I.A. O porta-voz disse na sexta-feira que a agência reteve cerca de 1.000 páginas de documentos relacionados ao golpe, além da história e um relato interno escrito posteriormente. Ele disse que os papéis destruídos no início de 1960 & # x27s eram duplicatas e arquivos de trabalho.

O historiador-chefe do Departamento de Estado disse que seu escritório recebeu uma cópia da história há sete anos, mas que nenhuma decisão sobre desclassificá-la ainda havia sido tomada.

A história secreta, junto com as avaliações operacionais escritas pelos planejadores do golpe, foi fornecida ao The Times por um ex-funcionário que manteve uma cópia.

Foi escrito em março de 1954 pelo Dr. Donald N. Wilber, um especialista em arquitetura persa que, como um dos principais planejadores, acreditava que agentes secretos tinham muito a aprender com a história.

Em memórias menos expansivas publicadas em 1986, o Dr. Wilber afirmou que o golpe no Irã foi diferente do posterior C.I.A. esforços. Seus planejadores americanos, disse ele, provocaram considerável agitação no Irã, dando aos iranianos uma escolha clara entre a instabilidade e o apoio ao xá. O movimento para destituir o primeiro-ministro, escreveu ele, ganhou, assim, apoio popular substancial.

As memórias do Dr. Wilber foram fortemente censuradas pela agência, mas ele foi autorizado a referir-se à existência de sua história secreta. & # x27 & # x27Se esta história tivesse sido lida pelos planejadores da Baía dos Porcos, & # x27 & # x27 ele escreveu, & # x27 & # x27não teria havido tal operação. & # x27 & # x27

& # x27 & # x27De tempos em tempos, & # x27 & # x27 ele continuou, & # x27 & # x27 dei palestras sobre a operação para vários grupos dentro da agência e, em retrospectiva, alguém pode se perguntar por que ninguém da mesa cubana jamais veio ou leia a história. & # x27 & # x27

O golpe foi um ponto de inflexão na história moderna do Irã e continua sendo um irritante persistente nas relações Teerã-Washington. Consolidou o poder do xá, que governou com mão de ferro por mais 26 anos em estreito contato com os Estados Unidos. Ele foi derrubado por militantes em 1979. Mais tarde naquele ano, manifestantes foram à embaixada americana, tomaram diplomatas como reféns e declararam que haviam desmascarado um & # x27 & # x27ninho de espiões & # x27 & # x27 que vinha manipulando o Irã por décadas.

O governo islâmico do aiatolá Ruhollah Khomeini apoiou ataques terroristas contra os interesses americanos em grande parte devido à longa história americana de apoio ao xá. Mesmo sob governantes mais moderados, muitos iranianos ainda se ressentem do papel dos Estados Unidos no golpe e de seu apoio ao xá.

A secretária de Estado Madeleine K. Albright, em um discurso em março, reconheceu o papel central do golpe & # x27s no relacionamento conturbado e esteve mais perto de se desculpar do que qualquer autoridade americana jamais esteve.

& # x27 & # x27A administração Eisenhower acreditava que suas ações eram justificadas por razões estratégicas & # x27 & # x27, disse ela. & # x27 & # x27Mas o golpe foi claramente um revés para o desenvolvimento político do Irã. E é fácil ver agora por que muitos iranianos continuam a se ressentir dessa intervenção da América em seus assuntos internos. & # X27 & # x27

A história explica os cálculos aos quais a Dra. Albright se referiu em seu discurso.

A Grã-Bretanha, diz ele, deu início ao complô em 1952. O governo Truman o rejeitou, mas o presidente Eisenhower o aprovou pouco depois de assumir o cargo em 1953, por causa de temores sobre o petróleo e o comunismo.

O documento tem poucas respostas, reconhecendo a certa altura que a agência mentiu descaradamente para seus aliados britânicos. Dr. Wilber reserva seus aparecimentos mais fulminantes para os aliados locais da agência, referindo-se a & # x27 & # x27a reconhecida incapacidade dos iranianos de planejar ou agir de maneira totalmente lógica. & # X27 & # x27

Grã-Bretanha luta contra o nacionalismo do petróleo

O golpe teve suas raízes em um confronto britânico com o Irã, inquieto sob décadas de domínio britânico quase colonial.

O prêmio foram os campos de petróleo do Irã. A Grã-Bretanha ocupou o Irã na Segunda Guerra Mundial para proteger uma rota de abastecimento para seu aliado, a União Soviética, e para evitar que o petróleo caísse nas mãos dos nazistas - expulsando o pai do xá, a quem considerava incontrolável. Após a guerra, manteve o controle do petróleo do Irã por meio da Anglo-Iranian Oil Company.

Em 1951, o Parlamento do Irã e 27 votou pela nacionalização da indústria do petróleo, e os legisladores que apoiavam a lei elegeram seu principal defensor, o Dr. Mossadegh, como primeiro-ministro.

A Grã-Bretanha respondeu com ameaças e sanções. O Dr. Mossadegh, um advogado formado na Europa na época com 70 e 27 anos, sujeito a lágrimas e explosões de raiva, recusou-se a recuar. Em reuniões em novembro e dezembro de 1952, diz a história secreta, funcionários da inteligência britânica assustaram seus colegas americanos com um plano para uma operação conjunta para expulsar o irritante primeiro-ministro.

Os americanos, que & # x27 & # x27 não tinham a intenção de discutir essa questão, & # x27 & # x27 concordaram em estudá-la, diz a história secreta. Tinha atrações. O anticomunismo havia se tornado febril em Washington, e as autoridades temiam que o Irã pudesse cair sob o domínio da União Soviética, uma presença histórica lá.

Em março de 1953, um acontecimento inesperado impulsionou a conspiração: a estação C.I.A. & # X27s de Teerã relatou que um general iraniano abordou a embaixada americana para apoiar um golpe liderado pelo exército.

O recém-inaugurado governo Eisenhower ficou intrigado. A coalizão que elegeu o Dr. Mossadegh estava se fragmentando, e o Partido Comunista Iraniano, o Tudeh, havia se tornado ativo.

Allen W. Dulles, o diretor da inteligência central, aprovou US $ 1 milhão em 4 de abril para ser usado & # x27 & # x27 de qualquer forma que pudesse causar a queda de Mossadegh & # x27 & # x27, diz a história.

Em poucos dias, os funcionários da agência identificaram um oficial de alto escalão, o general Fazlollah Zahedi, como o homem que lideraria o golpe. Seu plano exigia que o xá desempenhasse um papel de liderança.

& # x27 & # x27A combinação shah-General Zahedi, apoiada por C.I.A. ativos locais e apoio financeiro teriam uma boa chance de derrubar Mossadegh, & # x27 & # x27 oficiais escreveram, & # x27 & # x27particularmente se esta combinação for capaz de obter os maiores turbas nas ruas e se uma parte considerável de Teerã guarnição recusou-se a cumprir as ordens de Mossadegh & # x27s. & # x27 & # x27

Mas, de acordo com a história, os planejadores tinham dúvidas sobre se o xá seria capaz de realizar uma operação tão ousada.

Sua família havia conquistado o trono do Irã apenas 32 anos antes, quando seu poderoso pai liderou um golpe de Estado. Mas o jovem xá, escreveram funcionários da agência, era & # x27 & # x27 por natureza uma criatura da indecisão, atormentado por dúvidas e medos amorfos, & # x27 & # x27 frequentemente em conflito com sua família, incluindo a princesa Ashraf, seu & # x27 & # x27 forte e a conspiradora irmã gêmea. & # x27 & # x27

Além disso, o xá tinha o que o C.I.A. denominado & # x27 & # x27 medo patológico & # x27 & # x27 das intrigas britânicas, um obstáculo potencial para uma operação conjunta.

Em maio de 1953, a agência enviou o Dr. Wilber a Chipre para se encontrar com Norman Darbyshire, chefe do ramo iraniano da inteligência britânica, para fazer planos de golpe iniciais. Acalmar os temores do xá estava no topo da agenda, um documento da reunião dizia que ele deveria ser persuadido de que os Estados Unidos e a Grã-Bretanha & # x27 & # x27 consideram a questão do petróleo secundária. & # X27 & # x27

A conversa na reunião mudou para um assunto delicado, a identidade dos principais agentes dentro do Irã. Os britânicos disseram ter recrutado dois irmãos chamados Rashidian. Os americanos, a história secreta revela, não confiaram nos britânicos e mentiram sobre a identidade de seus melhores & # x27 & # x27assets & # x27 & # x27 dentro do Irã.

C.I.A. as autoridades estavam divididas sobre se o plano elaborado em Chipre poderia funcionar. A estação de Teerã avisou o quartel-general que o & # x27 & # x27o xá não agiria decisivamente contra Mossadegh. & # X27 & # x27 E disse que o general Zahedi, o homem escolhido para liderar o golpe, & # x27 & # x27 parecia faltar impulso, energia e planos concretos. & # x27 & # x27

Apesar das dúvidas, a agência & # x27s estação de Teerã começou a disseminar propaganda & # x27 & # x27gray & # x27 & # x27 distribuindo cartuns anti-Mossadegh nas ruas e plantando artigos desagradáveis ​​na imprensa local.

Tentando persuadir um xá relutante

A trama estava em andamento, embora o xá fosse um guerreiro relutante e o Sr. Eisenhower ainda não tivesse dado sua aprovação final.

No início de junho, oficiais de inteligência americanos e britânicos se reuniram novamente, desta vez em Beirute, e deram os toques finais na estratégia. Logo depois, o chefe da divisão C.I.A. & # X27s do Oriente Próximo e da África, Kermit Roosevelt, um neto de Theodore Roosevelt, chegou a Teerã para dirigi-la.

O xá foi um problema desde o início. O plano exigia que ele permanecesse firme como o C.I.A. despertou a inquietação popular e então, enquanto o país caminhava em direção ao caos, a emissão de decretos reais demitindo o Dr. Mossadegh e nomeando o general Zahedi como primeiro-ministro.

A agência procurou & # x27 & # x27produzir tal pressão sobre o xá que seria mais fácil para ele assinar os papéis exigidos do que recusar & # x27 & # x27, afirma a história secreta. Officials turned to his sister for help.

On July 11, President Eisenhower finally signed off on the plan. At about the same time, C.I.A. and British intelligence officers visited Princess Ashraf on the French Riviera and persuaded her to return to Iran and tell her brother to follow the script.

The return of the unpopular princess unleashed a storm of protest from pro-Mossadegh forces. The shah was furious that she had come back without his approval and refused at first to see her. But a palace staff member -- another British agent, according to the secret history -- gained Ashraf access on July 29.

The history does not reveal what the siblings said to each other. But the princess gave her brother the news that C.I.A. officials had enlisted Gen. H. Norman Schwarzkopf in the coup campaign. General Schwarzkopf, the father of the Persian Gulf war commander, had befriended the shah a decade earlier while leading the United States military mission to Iran, and he told the agency ''he was sure he could get the required cooperation.''

The British, too, sought to sway the shah and assure him their agents spoke for London. A British agent, Asadollah Rashidian, approached him in late July and invited him to select a phrase that would then be broadcast at prearranged times on the BBC's Persian-language program -- as proof that Mr. Rashidian spoke for the British.

The exercise did not seem to have much effect. The shah told Mr. Rashidian on July 30 and 31 that he had heard the broadcast, but ''requested time to assess the situation.''

In early August, the C.I.A. stepped up the pressure. Iranian operatives pretending to be Communists threatened Muslim leaders with ''savage punishment if they opposed Mossadegh,'' seeking to stir anti-Communist sentiment in the religious community.

In addition, the secret history says, the house of at least one prominent Muslim was bombed by C.I.A. agents posing as Communists. It does not say whether anyone was hurt in this attack.

The agency was also intensifying its propaganda campaign. A leading newspaper owner was granted a personal loan of about $45,000, ''in the belief that this would make his organ amenable to our purposes.''

But the shah remained intransigent. In an Aug. 1 meeting with General Schwarzkopf, he refused to sign the C.I.A.-written decrees firing Mr. Mossadegh and appointing General Zahedi. He said he doubted that the army would support him in a showdown.

During the meeting, the document says, the shah was so convinced that the palace was bugged that he ''led the general into the grand ballroom, pulled a small table to its exact center'' and got onto it to talk, insisting that the general do the same.

''This meeting was to be followed by a series of additional ones, some between Roosevelt and the shah and some between Rashidian and the shah, in which relentless pressure was exerted in frustrating attempts to overcome an entrenched attitude of vacillation and indecision,'' the history states.

Dr. Mossadegh had by now figured out that there was a plot against him. He moved to consolidate power by calling for a national referendum to dissolve Parliament.

The results of the Aug. 4 referendum were clearly rigged in his favor The New York Times reported the same day that the prime minister had won 99.9 percent of the vote. This only helped the plotters, providing 'ɺn issue on which Mossadegh could be relentlessly attacked'' by the agency-backed opposition press.

But the shah still wouldn't move against Dr. Mossadegh.

''On Aug. 3rd,'' the secret history says, ''Roosevelt had a long and inconclusive session with the shah,'' who ''stated that he was not an adventurer, and hence, could not take the chances of one.

''Roosevelt pointed out that there was no other way by which the government could be changed and the test was now between Mossadegh and his force and the shah and the army, which was still with him, but which would soon slip away.''

Mr. Roosevelt told the shah ''that failure to act could lead only to a Communist Iran or to a second Korea.''

Still haunted by doubts, the shah asked Mr. Roosevelt if President Eisenhower could tell him what to do.

'ɻy complete coincidence and great good fortune,'' the secret history says, ''the president, while addressing the governors' convention in Seattle on 4 August, deviated from his script to state by implication that the United States would not sit by idly and see Iran fall behind the Iron Curtain.''

By Aug. 10, the shah had finally agreed to see General Zahedi and a few army officers involved in the plot, but still refused to sign the decrees. The C.I.A. then sent Mr. Rashidian to say Mr. Roosevelt ''would leave in complete disgust unless the shah took action within a few days.''

The shah finally signed the decrees on Aug. 13. Word that he would support an army-led coup spread rapidly among the army officers backing General Zahedi.

First Few Days Look Disastrous

The coup began on the night of Aug. 15 and was immediately compromised by a talkative Iranian Army officer whose remarks were relayed to Mr. Mossadegh.

The operation, the secret history says, ''still might have succeeded in spite of this advance warning had not most of the participants proved to be inept or lacking in decision at the critical juncture.''

Dr. Mossadegh's chief of staff, Gen. Taghi Riahi, learned of the plot hours before it was to begin and sent his deputy to the barracks of the Imperial Guard.

The deputy was arrested there, according to the history, just as pro-shah soldiers were fanning out across the city arresting other senior officials. Telephone lines between army and government offices were cut, and the telephone exchange was occupied.

But phones inexplicably continued to function, which gave Dr. Mossadegh's forces a key advantage. General Riahi also eluded the pro-shah units, rallying commanders to the prime minister's side.

Pro-shah soldiers sent to arrest Dr. Mossadegh at his home were instead captured. The top military officer working with General Zahedi fled when he saw tanks and loyal government soldiers at army headquarters.

The next morning, the history states, the Tehran radio announced that a coup against the government had failed, and Dr. Mossadegh scrambled to strengthen his hold on the army and key installations. C.I.A. officers inside the embassy were flying blind the history says they had ''no way of knowing what was happening.''

Mr. Roosevelt left the embassy and tracked down General Zahedi, who was in hiding north of Tehran. Surprisingly, the general was not ready to abandon the operation. The coup, the two men agreed, could still work, provided they could persuade the public that General Zahedi was the lawful prime minister.

To accomplish this, the history discloses, the coup plotters had to get out the news that the shah had signed the two decrees.

The C.I.A. station in Tehran sent a message to The Associated Press in New York, asserting that ''unofficial reports are current to the effect that leaders of the plot are armed with two decrees of the shah, one dismissing Mossadegh and the other appointing General Zahedi to replace him.''

The C.I.A. and its agents also arranged for the decrees to be mentioned in some Tehran papers, the history says.

The propaganda initiative quickly bogged down. Many of the C.I.A.'s Iranian agents were under arrest or on the run. That afternoon, agency operatives prepared a statement from General Zahedi that they hoped to distribute publicly. But they could not find a printing press that was not being watched by forces loyal to the prime minister.

On Aug. 16, prospects of reviving the operation were dealt a seemingly a fatal blow when it was learned that the shah had bolted to Baghdad. C.I.A. headquarters cabled Tehran urging Mr. Roosevelt, the station chief, to leave immediately.

He did not agree, insisting that there was still 'ɺ slight remaining chance of success,'' if the shah would broadcast an address on the Baghdad radio and General Zahedi took an aggressive stand.

The first sign that the tide might turn came with reports that Iranian soldiers had broken up Tudeh, or Communist, groups, beating them and making them chant their support for the shah. ''The station continued to feel that the project was not quite dead,'' the secret history recounts.

Meanwhile, Dr. Mossadegh had overreached, playing into the C.I.A.'s hands by dissolving Parliament after the coup.

On the morning of Aug. 17 the shah finally announced from Baghdad that he had signed the decrees -- though he had by now delayed so long that plotters feared it was too late.

At this critical point Dr. Mossadegh let down his guard. Lulled by the shah's departure and the arrests of some officers involved in the coup, the government recalled most troops it had stationed around the city, believing that the danger had passed.

That night the C.I.A. arranged for General Zahedi and other key Iranian agents and army officers to be smuggled into the embassy compound ''in the bottom of cars and in closed jeeps'' for a 'ɼouncil of war.''

They agreed to start a counterattack on Aug. 19, sending a leading cleric from Tehran to the holy city of Qum to try to orchestrate a call for a holy war against Communism. (The religious forces they were trying to manipulate would years later call the United States ''the Great Satan.'')

Using travel papers forged by the C.I.A., key army officers went to outlying army garrisons to persuade commanders to join the coup.

Once again, the shah disappointed the C.I.A. He left Baghdad for Rome the next day, apparently an exile. Newspapers supporting Dr. Mossadegh reported that the Pahlevi dynasty had come to an end, and a statement from the Communist Party's central committee attributed the coup attempt to 'ɺnglo-American intrigue.'' Demonstrators ripped down imperial statues -- as they would again 26 years later during the Islamic revolution.

The C.I.A. station cabled headquarters for advice on whether to 'ɼontinue with TP-Ajax or withdraw.''

''Headquarters spent a day featured by depression and despair,'' the history states, adding, ''The message sent to Tehran on the night of Aug. 18 said that 'the operation has been tried and failed,' and that 'in the absence of strong recommendations to the contrary operations against Mossadegh should be discontinued.' ''

C.I.A. and Moscow Are Both Surprised

But just as the Americans were ready to quit, the mood on the streets of Tehran shifted.

On the morning of Aug. 19, several Tehran papers published the shah's long-awaited decrees, and soon pro-shah crowds were building in the streets.

''They needed only leadership,'' the secret history says. And Iranian agents of the C.I.A. provided it. Without specific orders, a journalist who was one of the agency's most important Iranian agents led a crowd toward Parliament, inciting people to set fire to the offices of a newspaper owned by Dr. Mossadegh's foreign minister. Another Iranian C.I.A. agent led a crowd to sack the offices of pro-Tudeh papers.

''The news that something quite startling was happening spread at great speed throughout the city,'' the history states.

The C.I.A. tried to exploit the situation, sending urgent messages that the Rashidian brothers and two key American agents should ''swing the security forces to the side of the demonstrators.''

But things were now moving far too quickly for the agency to manage. An Iranian Army colonel who had been involved in the plot several days earlier suddenly appeared outside Parliament with a tank, while members of the now-disbanded Imperial Guard seized trucks and drove through the streets. 'ɻy 10:15 there were pro-shah truckloads of military personnel at all the main squares,'' the secret history says.

By noon the crowds began to receive direct leadership from a few officers involved in the plot and some who had switched sides. Within an hour the central telegraph office fell, and telegrams were sent to the provinces urging a pro-shah uprising. After a brief shootout, police headquarters and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs fell as well.

The Tehran radio remained the biggest prize. With the government's fate uncertain, it was broadcasting a program on cotton prices. But by early afternoon a mass of civilians, army officers and policemen overwhelmed it. Pro-shah speakers went on the air, broadcasting the coup's success and reading the royal decrees.

At the embassy, C.I.A. officers were elated, and Mr. Roosevelt got General Zahedi out of hiding. An army officer found a tank and drove him to the radio station, where he spoke to the nation.

Dr. Mossadegh and other government officials were rounded up, while officers supporting General Zahedi placed ''known supporters of TP-Ajax'' in command of all units of the Tehran garrison.

The Soviet Union was caught completely off-guard. Even as the Mossadegh government was falling, the Moscow radio was broadcasting a story on ''the failure of the American adventure in Iran.''

But C.I.A. headquarters was as surprised as Moscow. When news of the coup's success arrived, it ''seemed to be a bad joke, in view of the depression that still hung on from the day before,'' the history says.

Throughout the day, Washington got most of its information from news agencies, receiving only two cablegrams from the station. Mr. Roosevelt later explained that if he had told headquarters what was going on, ''London and Washington would have thought they were crazy and told them to stop immediately,'' the history states.

Still, the C.I.A. took full credit inside the government. The following year it overthrew the government of Guatemala, and a myth developed that the agency could topple governments anywhere in the world.

Iran proved that third world king-making could be heady.

''It was a day that should never have ended,'' the C.I.A.'s secret history said, describing Aug. 19, 1953. 'ɿor it carried with it such a sense of excitement, of satisfaction and of jubilation that it is doubtful whether any other can come up to it.''

Donald Wilber, who planned the coup in Iran and wrote its secret history, was old-school C.I.A., a Princetonian and a Middle East architecture expert who fit neatly into the mold of the ''gentleman spy.''

Years of wandering through Middle Eastern architectural sites gave him the perfect cover for a clandestine life. By 1953, he was an obvious choice as the operation's strategist.

The coup was the high point of his life as a spy. Although he would excel in academia, at the agency being part-time was a handicap.

''I never requested promotion, and was given only one, after the conclusion of Ajax,'' Dr. Wilber wrote of the Iran operation.

On his last day, ''I was ushered down to the lobby by a young secretary, turned over my badge to her and left.'' He added, ''This treatment rankled for some time. I did deserve the paperweight.''


Mossadegh Ousted in Iran - History

Iran appears to be on the road to stability , commented Troy, New York newspaper The Times Record in their fresh reaction to the 1953 coup in Iran.

An adjacent editorial retroactively slammed Truman and Acheson for having tolerated Communist infiltration in the government. Este foi seguido por Eisenhower Is Right, which showered praise on the President s approach to fighting Communism.

Imagine how much they would have adored him had they only known that Ike had sanctioned an elaborate, covert CIA scheme to crush Premier Mossadegh, whom they passionately detested.

The surrender of pajama-clad Mohammed Mossadegh, ousted premier of Iran, is a dramatic incident in keeping with the sensation-packed developments of recent weeks. This tame surrender to the Shah s representative brought Mossadegh full circle. Only a few hours earlier he had placed a price on the head of the man to whom he surrendered himself, Premier Zehedi. [sic &mdash General Fazlollah Zahedi]

Behind the drama, however, lies substantial hope for Iran s return to tranquility under a stable and representative government. The would-be dictator is himself exhibiting confidence in the new government by surrendering. Evidently he is aware that the reign of the mobs and the terror of assassination which he instituted are ended. [Unbelievable gall]

Shah Pahlevi s [Mohammad Reza Pahlavi] order to protect Mossadegh and the scrupulous discharge by the new premier of his promise to safeguard the prisoner from lynching are good signs for the future. Legal processes apparently have been restored and the authorities are preserving order.

Moreover, moderation is substituted for violence. The fact that Mossadegh is not dealt with summarily speaks well for the new regime. Iran has seen too much rioting and bloodshed. The country desperately needs a calm and stable government. With Mossadegh in custody the chief source of disorder is removed.


Mossadegh Revisited

On August 19, 1953, tragedy struck Tehran, Iran’s capital city. Democratically-elected Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh was overthrown in a coup d’état orchestrated by the American CIA and British Mi6.

For the previous two centuries, foreign powers (largely Britain and Russia) had exerted a heavy hand in Iran’s affairs, reaping the country’s resources for themselves at the expense of Iran (as noted by Iran expert Christopher de Bellaigue in his book, Patriot of Persia) Mossadegh represented a very real chance for the Iranian people to get out from under the grip of foreign control and manipulation and chart their own path. Elected in 1951, he introduced many progressive reforms during his two years as prime minister, the most notable of which was the nationalization of the Iranian oil industry, under British control since 1913. The company represented for Iranians the oppression they had received at the hands of the British for centuries (de Bellaigue, 2012). By nationalizing oil and taking other steps to improve the lives of everyday Iranians, Mohammad Mossadegh became a national hero (Kinzer, 2003 de Bellaigue 2012). At last, it appeared as if the Iranian people were pushing back against the grip of foreign influence, and putting themselves in charge of their own affairs.

But the British would not let the oil affair go. And so, goading their American allies into thinking that Mossadegh’s leadership would steer Iran to Communism, the two partners successfully orchestrated a coup to depose Mossadegh. The Shah of Iran, who at the time had been largely relegated to the figure of a constitutional monarch, was given absolute authority over the country (de Bellaigue). His torturous reign lasted until 1979, when he was overthrown in the Iranian Revolution, and the “Islamic Republic” established. Under the new regime, the government has largely suppressed homages to both Mossadegh and the Shah (de Bellaigue).

Today in Iran, despite widespread name recognition, information on Mossadegh is suppressed, and most people do not know the details of his life and overthrow. The promise of Mossadegh’s governance was immense, but due to this suppression, Iranians are unable to reflect on their first experiment with democracy. It makes sense that an undemocratic regime like the Islamic Republic would censor information on Mossadegh, as his legacy has had powerful impacts throughout the region and the world his role in the Non-Aligned Movement, the coup’s relevance to recent events in the region, and the impacts the coup had on the perpetrators themselves are testament to this. Mossadegh’s legacy continues to exert a strong presence on both Iran and the region, despite his memory being suppressed in his home country.

In Iran, the suppression of Mossadegh’s legacy is typically well enforced. But every so often, there are times when a thaw in the iron grip of authority leads people to examine Mossadegh and the 1953 coup. It happened after the Shah was overthrown (but before the Islamic Republic fully established itself), it happened in the late 90s with the election of a liberal prime minister, and it is happening now (de Bellaigue, 2012).

Currently, one of Tehran’s most popular plays focuses on Mohammad Mossadegh and the coup d’etat to oust his government. Called “Dr Mossadeq’s Nightly Reports,” it is the director Asghar Khalili’s attempt to make Mossadegh better known in a substantive, not merely superficial, way.

That superficiality is partly what makes Mossadegh’s legacy in Iran so peculiar. People know of him, but they don’t know much about him. Thus, the play seems to be feeding a curiosity in young Iranians surrounding the figure of Mossadegh and the events of 1953. One audience member said, “I came because I don’t know much about Mossadegh though we owe him a lot. They do him an injustice by overlooking him here. It’s important to get more information.”

It is therefore not a surprise that the play has generated so much interest in Tehran. But not all of the information coming out on Mossadegh in Iran is genuine in its complete historical accuracy. Although they allowed it to run, government authorities have forced changes onto the play’s script. A new television show has also debuted on the coup, but it is heavily censored, with a strong bias toward the Islamic regime.

Even Mossadegh’s place of death is well known by Iranians despite limitations on information about his life. Mossadegh passed away in 1967, after over a decade of house arrest, and is buried on his estate in the small village of Ahmad Abad. During the political thaw after the Shah fell, people came from far and wide to Ahmad Abad to pay their respects. On the twelfth anniversary of Mossadegh’s death, several hundred thousand people descended on Ahmad Abad to visit Mossadegh’s home (de Bellaigue, 2012). However, when the Islamic Republic consolidated their hold over the country, the rate of visitation slowed to a trickle. The caretaker of Mossadegh’s estate notes that “[The Islamic regime] do not want people to know he’s here to arouse nationalism again.” In spite of this, there’s a common familiarity with the town over a wide radius.

Of the few tributes to Mossadegh that remain in Iran, most are implicit: March 20th, the day oil was nationalized, is a national holiday, but it doesn’t explicitly celebrate Mossadegh’s role in that accomplishment. As Khalili, the director of the aforementioned play, notes, “school textbooks only treat Mossadeq briefly.” He believes that the image of Mossadegh is suppressed not because he was secular but because he is an advocate of democracy.

Despite the fact that the Islamic Republic distances itself from Mossadegh as much as possible, perhaps the most major event of the revolution known to Westerners, the Iranian Hostage Crisis, occurred in the shadow of Mossadegh’s legacy. Iranians correctly saw the American embassy as the “den of spies” from which the 1953 coup had been launched, and so to prevent an American attempt to put the ousted Shah back into power, they seized the embassy. Yet this parallel isn’t discussed openly in Iran, or the fact that the many of the high ranking clergy worked with the “Great Satan” to overthrow Mossadegh (de Bellaigue, 2012 Kinzer, 2003).

The suppression of information on, and celebration of, Mohammad Mossadegh in Iran has been robust and near-total. The government either denies access to or alters works mentioning Mossadegh (including Stephen Kinzer’s tremendous account of the coup, All the Shah’s Men) As Kinzer notes, “Laws forbade calling for a democratic republican to replace the Islamic regime, but praising Mossadegh’s legacy was another way of doing the same thing.” People are generally in the dark about many of the details of his life, one of the reason for the aforementioned play’s success. There is a great misunderstanding amongst many people about some of the most mundane aspects of Mossadegh’s legacy, including what caused his death (Kinzer, 2003).

Yet outside Iran, Mossadegh’s legacy pervades movements around the world. Three years after Mossadegh’s ousting, Egypt’s president Gamal Abdel Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal. Many believe that Mossadegh inspired Nasser to nationalize the Canal, with the British once again becoming bogged down in a conflict with a strong nationalist foe. In this case, Nasser was successful, and the last vestiges of the once-mighty British Empire died in Egypt. Although Mossadegh was unable to remove foreign influence from Iran, the strength of his efforts helped Egypt to do so.

Five years after the Suez Crisis, Nasser and other nationalist leaders gathered in Belgrade, Yugoslavia, to form the Non-Aligned Movement, which was founded on the principle of neutrality towards the major two Cold War power blocs. Today, the NAM has grown to 115 countries. The movement “represents the interests and priorities of developing countries” and represents a sort of anti-power bloc, where Great Powers are not permitted to engage.

Prior to the 16th NAM summit in Tehran in 2012, Iranian history expert Hamid Dabashi wrote that “had Mosaddegh been allowed to be in office, he would have been a natural ally of the Non-Aligned Movement, perhaps one of its founding figures. It is not even too far fetched to think that the treacherous coup against Mossadegh’s government was at least a factor behind the Non-Aligned Movement.” Mossadegh was a strong proponent of charting an independent course for Iran and wresting the Middle East from European intervention, while the NAM is dedicated to both the economic and governmental sovereignty of its member nations from those of the large power blocs. Thus, Mossadegh’s views on economic and legislative freedom were completely congruent with those of the Non-Aligned Movement.

It is also possible to draw parallels between the 1953 coup and subsequent events in the region and around the world. US Secretary of State John Kerry recently did just that, saying at a recent talk at the University of Chicago that “[T]he CIA was directly involved in the removal of a Prime Minister — Mossadegh, 1953. And so there was a history there. And in 1979, when they took over our embassy and took them hostages that had a profound effect on our own politics — one of the principal reasons that President Carter lost to Ronald Reagan.” The coup had consequences nearly thirty years after it was carried out, both on the country that perpetrated it and its victim. The US has since expressed remorse for their part in overthrowing Mossadegh, but bizarrely, it seems to see the episode as an isolated event, as opposed to noticing similar problems in its broad-scale intervention in the region.

More than thirty years on from the election of Reagan, and more than sixty since the coup, the effects of the overthrow of Mossadegh continue to influence events in the region. An anonymous Iranian official drew parallels between last summer’s coup in Turkey and that which deposed of Mossadegh, saying “this coup might be made up of several waves it happened in Iran in 1953. When the first coup failed, they had another one ready — and they succeeded.”

It is clear that, on that night in Turkey, the visage of Mossadegh hung over events taking place in the streets, much as it had done in the Suez sixty years earlier. Within the region and around the world, the legacy of Mossadegh has had a positive influence on nations seeking to chart a course away from foreign influences that would disregard their sovereignty, and toward self-determination. In this modern era, with Western powers still exploiting their way through the Third World, it is clear that colonialism has not ended, but only evolved. In a myriad number of cases, Western governments and corporations are still making off with vast quantities of plundered resources from under-developed nations. “Mossadeghism” is the insistence that these foreign influences pack up, go home, and leave the running of and resources of a country to its people.

People in Iran today speak of Mossadegh “with regret and even guilt, as well as with reverence” (de Bellaigue, 2012). Yet even for those Iranians who wish to look back on Mossadegh’s life, the continue censorship of information about him forestalls any real attempt at understanding. In a testament to how powerful Mossadegh could be in Iran if he were more widely understood, Mossadegh’s legacy has had profound effects in other parts of the region — events like the Suez Crisis, the founding of the Non-Aligned Movement, and even the recent coup in Turkey all bear his fingerprints.

However, the influence of those who unjustly ousted Mossadegh lingers. As long as the US continues its behavior of Middle East intervention and support of unpopular regimes in the region, the Islamic government currently in power in Tehran has fodder to use to scare its subjects into submission, and is able to justify its continued suppression of the memory of Mossadegh and democracy. Mossadegh is as real as Iran itself, but he remains only a distant and hazy memory. It seems as if only when democracy creeps back out of the shadows in Iran will the name Mossadegh ring forth once more.


Mossadegh Ousted in Iran - History

C oup 53 of Iran is the CIA's (Central Intelligence Agency) first successful overthrow of a foreign government.

But a copy of the agency's secret history of the coup has surfaced, revealing the inner workings of a plot that set the stage for the Islamic revolution in 1979, and for a generation of anti-American hatred in one of the Middle East's most powerful countries. The document, which remains classified, discloses the pivotal role British intelligence officials played in initiating and planning the coup, and it shows that Washington and London shared an interest in maintaining the West's control over Iranian oil.

Dr. Donald N. Wilber, a CIA spy, with the cover of archeologist and authority on ancient Persia,
who planned the coup in Iran along with British SIS officer Norman Darbyshire.
(Photo courtesy of National Security Archive)
The secret history, written by the CIA's chief coup planner, says the operation's success was mostly a matter of chance. The document shows that the agency had almost complete contempt for the man it was empowering, Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi. And it recounts, for the first time, the agency's badly tried to seduce and force the shah into taking part in his own coup.

The operation, code-named TP-AJAX, was the blueprint for a succession of CIA plots to foment coups and destabilize governments during the cold war - including the agency's successful coup in Guatemala in 1954 and the disastrous Cuban intervention known as the Bay of Pigs in 1961. In more than one instance, such operations led to the same kind of long-term animosity toward the United States that occurred in Iran.

The history says agency officers orchestrating the Iran coup worked directly with royalist Iranian military officers, handpicked the prime minister's replacement, sent a stream of envoys to bolster the shah's courage, directed a campaign of bombings by Iranians posing as members of the Communist Party, and planted articles and editorial cartoons in newspapers.

But on the night set for Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddeq's overthrow, almost nothing went according to the meticulously drawn plans, the secret history says. In fact, CIA officials were poised to flee the country when several Iranian officers recruited by the agency, acting on their own, took command of a pro-shah demonstration in Tehran and seized the government.

Two days after the coup, the history discloses, agency officials funneled $5 million to Iran to help the government they had installed consolidate power.

Dr. Donald N. Wilber, an expert in Persian architecture, who as one of the leading planners believed that covert operatives had much to learn from history, wrote the secret history, along with operational assessments in March 1954.

In less expansive memoirs published in 1986, Dr. Wilber asserted that the Iran coup was different from later CIA efforts. Its American planners, he said, had stirred up considerable unrest in Iran, giving Iranians a clear choice between instability and supporting the shah. The move to oust the prime minister, he wrote, thus gained substantial popular support.

Dr. Wilber's memoirs were heavily censored by the agency, but he was allowed to refer to the existence of his secret history. "If this history had been read by the planners of the Bay of Pigs," he wrote, "there would have been no such operation."

"From time to time," he continued, "I gave talks on the operation to various groups within the agency, and, in hindsight, one might wonder why no one from the Cuban desk ever came or read the history."

The coup was a turning point in modern Iranian history and remains a persistent irritant in Tehran-Washington relations. It consolidated the power of the shah, who ruled with an iron hand for 26 more years in close contact with the United States. He was toppled by Iranian Revolution of 1979. Later that year, "Students of Imam Line" went to the American Embassy, took diplomats hostage and declared that they had unmasked a "nest of spies" who had been manipulating Iran for decades.

The Islamic government of Ayatollah Khomeini supported terrorist attacks against American interests largely because of the long American history of supporting the shah's suppressive regime. Even under more moderate rulers, many Iranians still resent the United States' role in the coup and its support of the shah.

Former US Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright, in an address, acknowledged the coup's pivotal role in the troubled relationship and came closer to apologizing than any American official ever has before.

"The Eisenhower administration believed its actions were justified for strategic reasons," she said. "But the coup was clearly a setback for Iran's political development. And it is easy to see now why many Iranians continue to resent this intervention by America in their internal affairs."

The history spells out the calculations to which Dr. Albright referred in her speech. Britain, it says, initiated the plot in 1952. The Truman administration rejected it, but President Eisenhower approved it shortly after taking office in 1953, because of fears about oil and Communism.

The document pulls few punches, acknowledging at one point that the agency baldly lied to its British allies. Dr. Wilber reserves his most withering asides for the agency's local allies, referring to "the recognized incapacity of Iranians to plan or act in a thoroughly logical manner."

Shah with General Fazlollah Zahdei (right), spearhead
of CIA planned coup of 1953 in favour of Shah
Britain Fights Oil Nationalism
The coup had its roots in a British showdown with Iran, restive under decades of near-colonial British domination.

The prize was Iran's oil fields. Britain occupied Iran in World War II to protect a supply route to its ally, the Soviet Union, and to prevent the oil from falling into the hands of the Nazis - ousting the shah's father, whom it regarded as unmanageable. It retained control over Iran's oil after the war through the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company.

In 1951, Iran's Parliament voted to nationalize the oil industry, and legislators backing the law elected its leading advocate, Dr. Mosaddeq, as prime minister. Britain responded with threats and sanctions.

Dr. Mosaddeq, a European-educated lawyer then in his early 70's, prone to tears and outbursts, refused to back down. In meetings in November and December 1952, the secret history says, British intelligence officials startled their American counterparts with a plan for a joint operation to oust the nettlesome prime minister.

The Americans, who "had not intended to discuss this question at all," agreed to study it, the secret history says. It had attractions. Anti-Communism had risen to a fever pitch in Washington, and officials were worried that Iran might fall under the sway of the Soviet Union, a historical presence there.

In March 1953, an unexpected development pushed the plot forward: the CIA's Tehran station reported that an Iranian general had approached the American Embassy about supporting an army-led coup.

The newly inaugurated Eisenhower administration was intrigued. The coalition that elected Dr. Mosaddeq was splintering, and the Iranian Communist Party, the Tudeh, had become active.

Allen W. Dulles, the director of central intelligence, approved $1 million on April 4 to be used "in any way that would bring about the fall of Mosaddeq," the history says.

"The aim was to bring to power a government which would reach an equitable oil settlement, enabling Iran to become economically sound and financially solvent, and which would vigorously prosecute the dangerously strong Communist Party."

Within days agency officials identified a high-ranking officer, Gen. Fazlollah Zahedi, as the man to spearhead a coup. Their plan called for the shah to play a leading role.

"A shah-General Zahedi combination, supported by CIA local assets and financial backing, would have a good chance of overthrowing Mosaddeq," officials wrote, "particularly if this combination should be able to get the largest mobs in the streets and if a sizable portion of the Tehran garrison refused to carry out Mosaddeq's orders."

But according to the history, planners had doubts about whether the shah could carry out such a bold operation.

His family had seized Iran's throne just 32 years earlier, when his powerful father led a coup of his own. But the young shah, agency officials wrote, was "by nature a creature of indecision, beset by formless doubts and fears," often at odds with his family, including Princess Ashraf, his "forceful and scheming twin sister."

Also, the shah had what the CIA termed a "pathological fear" of British intrigues, a potential obstacle to a joint operation.

In May 1953 the agency sent Dr. Wilber to Cyprus to meet Norman Darbyshire, chief of the Iran branch of British intelligence, to make initial coup plans. Assuaging the fears of the shah was high on their agenda a document from the meeting said he was to be persuaded that the United States and Britain "consider the oil question secondary."

The conversation at the meeting turned to a touchy subject, the identity of key agents inside Iran. The British said they had recruited two brothers named Rashidian. The Americans, the secret history discloses, did not trust the British and lied about the identity of their best "assets" inside Iran.

CIA officials were divided over whether the plan drawn up in Cyprus could work. The Tehran station warned headquarters that the "the shah would not act decisively against Mosaddeq." And it said General Zahedi, the man picked to lead the coup, "appeared lacking in drive, energy and concrete plans."

Despite the doubts, the agency's Tehran station began disseminating "gray propaganda," passing out anti-Mosaddeq cartoons in the streets and planting unflattering articles in the local press.


Mossadegh & Me

Mossadegh & Me is a film about how we remember the 1950s in Iran, and the CIA coup that ousted then Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh.

In 1979, the Iranian Hostage Crisis shocked the world. The crisis received more non-stop press coverage than any other event since World War II. Americans, for the first time, asked, "Why do they hate us?" As an Iranian-American kid, director Gita Saedi Kiely asked that question, too. That’s when her father told her about Mohammed Mossadegh.

The story of Mossadegh (1882-1967) is woven into the fabric of every Iranian family. As Prime Minister of Iran, Mossadegh initiated democracy in the Middle East half a century before the United States declared the ideology a justification for war in the region. He became a symbol of independence and hope for a people. And the story of his rise and fall has as much to do with American history as it does Iranian history. His tenure came to an abrupt halt when the newly-formed C.I.A. implemented its first covert coup d’etat. In August of 1953, Mossadegh was ousted, arrested for treason, and replaced by the Western-endorsed Shah of Iran.

Iranians hold onto this complicated history no matter where they reside. Mossadegh & Me will follow Saedi Kiely’s father and his peers as they remember this moment in Iran – as students, activists and dreamers. By examining the subjectivity of perception and recollection (the "Rashomon effect"), Mossadegh & Me will explore how we remember the past as it fits into our own cultural narrative. Attaching personal memories to this tumultuous time, Mossadegh & Me spins a cautionary tale of historic importance while ruminating on ideas of homeland and history.

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With a noted tradition of nurturing emerging talent and acting as a leading voice for independent media, Kartemquin is building on more than 50 years of history as Chicago's documentary powerhouse.

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Assista o vídeo: Golpe dos EUA CIA no Irã em 1953


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